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We thank the Editor of Law, Probability and Risk for the opportunity to present our
paper in the form of a discussion. We also thank the two discussants for their comments
and for the time they dedicated to the study of our paper.
We are pleased to see the reactions from such a large group of scientists about a paper
that aims to clarify the fundamental term ‘uncertainty’ and its connection with the use
of the Bayes factor as a relevant statistic for evidence evaluation in forensic science. It is
encouraging to see that Nordgaard considers the paper “a most important contribution”
and that he “agree[s] in principle (...) on the message”. However, we will not count on
the number of supporters of our view as a measure of the relevance or ‘correctness’ of the
material we have presented. This would amount to an argumentum ad populum and which
is where Sjerps et al. with their reference to ‘other proponents’ to the contrary, towards
the end of their discussion, seem to lead us.
Let us clarify the issue we have raised: we have asked the question ‘what are the compo-
nents of the likelihood ratio?’. We have seen that these components emphasise the need to
consider our probability of the forensic findings, given di↵erent propositions. By definition,
probability is a number, and this number expresses our uncertainty about a target event,
given clearly stated propositions and conditioning information. This personal uncertainty
can in principle be elicited, as it exists, by a single number, for you, us and anybody else
in their own way. But two things are important. First, we are not uncertain about this
elicited number (only about the event of interest), because it is the number that itself is
the expression of uncertainty. Second, there is exactly one number expressing our state of
uncertainty for two di↵erent numbers would express two di↵erent states of uncertainty.
This is a natural understanding of the subjectivist belief-type interpretation of proba-
bility, but this choice is not a mere opinion, nor is it adopted by convenience. We advocate
the belief-type interpretation of probability and its measurement by reference to a standard
because it satisfies an operational definition [1], that is a definition that allows us to say
precisely what we mean. Its conclusions derive inevitably from the stated assumptions and
a↵ect the thinking individual   that is all of us   in a most fundamental way. This may
be why people find these conclusions di cult to accept. Yet this view on probability   its
measurement by reference to a standard   provides a precise and clear conceptual account
of what we mean when we say that we are uncertain about something.
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The upshot of the above is that the denominator of the likelihood ratio is a probability
Pr(·), our expression of uncertainty about the findings under stated assumptions, but we
are not uncertain about the uncertainty expression Pr(·). Hence we are not going to place
a probability on a probability   and hence we have no uncertainty about the likelihood
ratio. This is our main point.
Nordgaard rightly argues, and we fully agree, that there is a di↵erence between the fun-
damental understanding of probability being given by a single number and our practical
proceedings in the light of this fundamental understanding: it is what he terms the di -
culty of being convinced that one has found one’s probability. Thus, the next step should be
to find viable practical ways to work with this understanding. This is where the challenge
lies, but that challenge is beyond the scope of our paper. However, we are not going to
avoid this practical challenge by bending the logic of the theory (of probability) so that it is
going to provide a better description of our intuitive perception of our state of uncertainty.
We must not confuse the descriptive and the normative perspective, nor should we confuse
the concept of uncertainty measurement with the practice of measurement. We entirely
share Nordgaard’s concerns about the di culties a forensic scientist might encounter in
the assessment of probabilities. Probability assessment in forensic science is a very di cult
task for anybody, not only for a scientist whose background is in biology and chemistry
and who has not been required to acquire statistical knowledge, but also for a statistician
who is unlikely to have the necessary background to understand the principles of forensic
investigation. However, as far as the process of evaluation is concerned, we do not believe
it should be driven by methodological feasibility, anchored to a forensic scientist’s remi-
niscences from quantitative courses. We agree it is not a major concern of the academic
training of forensic scientists to assist statisticians in contrast, it is the statisticians’ role
to assist the forensic scientist in the process of evaluation [2].
We recognise Nordgaard’s observation that in practical proceedings one may end up
with several di↵erent likelihood ratios, which may be due, for example, to di↵erent experts
looking at the same findings. Further, we agree with the idea that it is advisable and
insightful to consider di↵erent values for input parameters and investigate their e↵ect on
our likelihood ratio. There is nothing wrong with this technique, known in this context
as sensitivity analysis, and a technique which is also supported by the evaluative guideline
provided by the European Networks of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI). Also, we have
never been opposed to the device of framing one’s likelihood ratio along expressions such as
‘a likelihood ratio in the order of 500 (a million etc.)’, acknowledging the above constraints.
Indeed, it may be anything from feasible to assign a likelihood ratio as, for example, exactly
998. Moreover, such a value is not substantially di↵erent from 1000 or 997. All of this is
part of established forensic science thinking. None of this, however, involves a procedure to
build a distribution over the likelihood ratio, an idea which is avoided because it is unsuitable
for combination with the belief updating scheme of the recipient of expert information.
On several occasions, Sjerps et al. raise the question of what to report to the court.
They emphasise that a population parameter has a probability distribution attached to it.
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We could not agree more, as this is the essence of the Bayesian paradigm, and we have
never argued the contrary view. We also do not oppose the provision of an opinion on
such a distribution where the object of the reporting is the parameter itself and a prior
can be justified (e.g., in blood alcohol cases, proportion of illicit items in a seizure etc.).
This reporting may be a reference to the distribution in its entirety, its credible intervals
or convenient summaries. It is reasonable to quantify uncertainty in this context. For
example, a legal requirement for alcohol levels can be that the 95% lower bound needs to
be above the legal limit for a charge to be brought. We agree with this argument as the
concern is with a limit on a measurement. However, the likelihood ratio is concerned with
the best measure of the value of the evidence. This is a di↵erent concept from a lower
limit on a measurement. The determination of a distribution for a parameter is not the
object of our discussion. The object of our discussion is the best way in which to report
a likelihood ratio. To suggest otherwise would mean a return to times when reporting on
DNA profiling results was limited to disparate summaries of population data (so-called
‘frequencies’), an approach which is fraught with complications that in the likelihood ratio
era can be e↵ectively avoided. In other words, summaries of population data are not a
summary of the value of evidence.
Sjerps et al. argue that reporting a single number for the likelihood ratio deprives the
legal justice system of essential information needed to assess the reliability of the evidence.
Highlighting parameter uncertainty is a relevant topic for the discussion of distributions of
parameters, but it does not address what Sjerps et al. refer to as reliability. One possible
definition of reliability is the question of whether a given likelihood ratio supports the
correct proposition. This definition can be addressed by simulating forensic findings given
conditions that represent either the prosecution’s or the defence case, and obtaining a single
likelihood ratio in each simulation and hence a distribution. There is no distribution for a
likelihood ratio when evaluating the findings in an individual case.
Sjerps et al. also give an example with three experts using di↵erent datasets and ob-
taining the same likelihood ratio. They then state that it is misleading not to tell the
courts that the results are not equally reliable. We assume, here, in contrast to the earlier
suggested definition, that by reliability Sjerps et al. mean precision, where, statistically,
precision is the reciprocal of variance. They then comment that knowledge of reliability is
essential information without explaining why it is essential. What is it that is ‘essential’
about the knowledge of reliability? The likelihood ratio provides the best assessment of
the value of the evidence. Knowledge of reliability does not alter that.
Another reason given by Sjerps et al. for a statement of the reliability is that di↵erent
datasets may give di↵erent values for the likelihood ratio. If this is the case, it is a matter
to be resolved by cross-examination. It is not a matter to be resolved by considering
whether associated probability or confidence intervals overlap. If the di↵erent likelihood
ratios di↵er by a large amount (in some sense) this is indicative of di↵ering assumptions
or, perhaps, di↵erent datasets on the part of the experts. Again, this is a matter to be
explored by cross-examination, not by a statement of reliability.
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In conclusion, we are not going to report on the distribution of the likelihood ratio.
Instead, we report on a single value for the likelihood ratio. This is informed by all our
knowledge of the population parameter, as represented by our posterior distribution for it.
The natural way to do this, in the full Bayesian paradigm, is to take parameter uncertainty
into account by the procedure known as ‘extension of the conversation’ for discrete data
or the integration over the parameter of interest for continuous data [3]. We disagree that
integration is a loss of information. Rather, integration is an incorporation of the available
information into the evaluation of the evidence in order to provide the best assessment of
its value. The result is a single probability assignment that is based on all that we know,
at a given instance of time and which is the measure of our uncertainty about the evidence.
Once this single number has been determined, it is specific to the case in question. It is
not then sensible to attribute uncertainty to this number, with an implicit reference to
hypothetical repetitions as in a frequentist procedure.
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